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Abstract
The article explores the relationship between public debt and environmental debt. The
latter is defined as the difference between the "virgin state" which is the maximum
stock of environmental quality that can be kept intact with natural regenerations and
the current quality of the environment. A theoretical model of endogenous growth is
built. We show that there is a unique well-determined balanced-growth path. The public
debt and the environmental debt are substitute in the short-run but complementary in
the long-run. Indeed, budget deficit provides additional resources to finance pollution
abatement spending, but generate also unproductive expenditures (the debt burden).
This hypothesis is tested on a sample of 22 countries for the period 1990-2011. The
environmental debt is measured by the cumulative CO2 emissions per capita. We use
panel time-series estimators which allow for heterogeneity in the slope coefficients between
countries. It appears mainly that, in the long term, an increase of 100% in public debt
ratio leads to an increase of 74% in cumulative CO2 per capita. In addition, this positive
long-run relationship is still present at the country and the sub-sample level, despite some
differences in the short-term dynamics.
Keywords: environmental debt, public debt, heterogenous panel data model
JEL codes: O44, Q52, Q58
1. Introduction
Sustainable development has long been considered being backed on three pillars. Re-
cent history, however, shed light on two distinguishing features of unsustainable devel-
opment. They stem from global environmental degradation and especially from climate
change and rising sovereign indebtedness. On the one side, energy-related CO2 emissions
rose a historic high of 33.1 Gt CO2 in 2018 (International Energy Agency, 2019). This
raised once more the issue of the environmental i.e. climatic debt that will be borne by
future generations (Azar and Holmberg, 1995) with a major shift in responsibilities from
developed to developing countries (Botzen et al., 2008). On the other side, indebted-
ness has been soaring, especially in the aftermath of the 2007-2008 crisis. Fast increase
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in public indebtedness is seen as “the most enduring legacies of the 2007-2009 financial
crises” especially when it comes as a major impediment to economic growth (Reinhart
and Rogoff, 2010; Eberhardt and Presbitero, 2015). Several authors, therefore, urged
for both reforms of the fiscal and financial systems, which are deemed to prompt the
right incentives to green growth (Aglietta and Hourcade, 2012). This is all the more
necessary in the face of increasing concerns on the ability of NDCs, even if fully imple-
mented, to meet the climate targets agreed in the 2015 Paris Agreement. For instance,
promoting renewable energy is the most common mitigation strategy while agriculture
and transport are seldom considered as key sectors for mitigation though, along with en-
ergy and industry, they are the largest contributors to GHG emissions (Pauw et al., 2018).
This paper contributes to the sparse literature on the interaction between environmen-
tal and macroeconomic policies while scrutinizing the relationship between sovereign and
environmental debt.2 One could argue that higher public indebtedness is legitimate for
financing investments in low-carbon technologies or environmental R&D activities which
will mainly benefit to future generations. This assertion can, however, be challenged
when the government has run deficits for many years. Hence, one can wonder about the
consequences of public debt stabilization on environmental policies and outcomes. Under
the assumption that public debt initiates additional pressure on the environment, debt
for nature swaps can generate positive environmental outcomes. This possibility has been
explored in the case of deforestation.3 It can also be argued that debt servicing crowds
out private expenditures that can entail abatement expenditures. Fodha and Seegmuller
(2014) show that public abatement partly financed by debt emission may even lead the
economy to an environmental poverty trap under a stabilizing debt constraint.
This paper theoretically and empirically explores further the interdependencies be-
tween environmental and sovereign debt in a long term perspective. In Section 3, relax-
ing the balanced-budget rule assumption, a simple endogenous growth model establishes
a complement effect between public and environmental debt along the balanced growth
path of the economy. Unproductive public expenditures, i.e. the debt burden, crowd
out pollution abatement expenditures. Relying on cumulative per capita consumption-
based CO2 emissions as a proxy of environmental debt in Section 4, our results show that
in 22 countries increasing the debt-to-output ratio has a statistically and economically
significant impact on the environmental debt in the long run.
2 See for a brief review e.g. (Combes et al., 2015).
3 Kahn and McDonald (1995) provided econometric support for this hypothesis while Cassimon et al.
(2011) cast some doubts on the possibility of scaling up debt for nature swaps.
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2. The model
We consider a simple continuous-time endogenous-growth model with a representative
individual, who consists of a household and a competitive firm, and a government. All
agents are infinitely-lived and have perfect foresight.
2.1. Environmental debt
In the economy, environmental quality (Qt) determines nature’s capacity to grow and
absorbs wastes from economic activity. Following Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen (1991) and
Bovenberg and Smulders (1995), the evolution of environmental quality, or equivalently
the evolution of the stock of environmental goods is modeled as a renewable resource
Q̇t = E(Qt) − Pt, (1)
where a dot over a variable represents a time derivative.
In Eq. (1), Pt represents reduction in environmental quality, or natural resources,
from the net flow of emissions (say pollution), and E(·) is an environmental regeneration
function and reflects the capacity of the environment to absorb pollution. We consider
several standard assumptions.
Assumptions.
(i) E(Qt) ∈ C1(R+)
(ii) E ′(Qt) < 0 (the law of entropy )
(iii) there is a critical level Q̄ > 0, such that E(Q̄) = 0 (virgin state)
Assumption (i) states that the regeneration process is a smooth function. Assump-
tion (ii) means that the higher the stock of natural resources, the higher the difficulties to
maintain or increase this stock through natural regeneration processes (which is an impli-
cation of the entropy law from physics, see Smulders, 1995). Assumption (iii) states that,
without pollution (Pt = 0), environmental quality reaches its highest possible (finite) level
– the “virgin state” Q̄ – which is the maximal stock of natural resources that can be kept
intact by natural regeneration. However, this virgin-state cannot be sustained, because
economic activity incurs polluting emissions; namely the production process uses inputs
(Zt) that pollute the environment, such as, e.g., pesticides in agriculture, fossil fuels re-
sulting in emissions of carbon. Such adverse effect of production can be (at least partially)
neutralized by abatement spending. As usual, we assume that this abatement activity
is provided by the public sector through governement’s expenditure (Gt). Consequently,
the net flow of emission is
Pt =
(
Zt
Gt
)µ
, (2)
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where µ > 0 measure the elasticity of emissions to the polluting input.4
We define the gap between the virgin-state stock and the current environmental qual-
ity as the environmental debt (Dt), namely
Dt = Q̄ − Qt. (3)
In the long-run, would the economy reach the virgin state (Q∗ = Q̄, where a star
denotes steady-state values), the environmental debt would be zero (D∗ = 0). Owing
to economic activity, however, environmental quality is perpetually damaged, such that
Qt < Q̄, even in the long-run. We can then define the gap Q̄ − Qt as the obligations of
the ecosystem towards nature.
2.2. Households
The representative household starts at the initial period with a positive stock of
capital (K0), and chooses the path of consumption {Ct}t≥0, and capital {Kt}t>0, so as to
maximize the present discount value of its lifetime utility
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(Ct, Qt) dt, (4)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) the subjective discount rate. The instantaneous utility is assumed to be
separable
u(Ct, Qt) = log(Ct) + η log(Qt),
where η > 0 captures environmental preferences.
The household enters period t with initial (predetermined) stocks of private capital
(Kt) and government bonds (Bt), whose returns are respectively qt (the rental rate of
capital) and rt (the real interest rate). He perceives wages (wtL), pays taxes (where
τw ∈ (0, 1) is the proportional wage income tax rate), and decides how much to consume
(Ct) and save during the period. The only forms of asset accumulation are capital (K̇t, we
omit capital depreciation, without loss of generality) and government bonds (Ḃt); hence
the following budget constraint
K̇t + Ḃt = rtBt + qtKt + (1 − τw)wtL − Ct. (5)
The first-order conditions give rise to the familiar Euler equation (with qt = rt in
competitive equilibrium)
Ċt
Ct
= rt − ρ, (6)
4 Zt is the flow of effective pollution, which depends both on emissions and on the abatement spending:
Zt = P
1/µ
t Gt. Thus, the same Zt can be achieved with less emissions if the economy has access to more
abatement. The exponent µ denotes a pollution-conversion parameter: a lower µ makes pollution more
effective, or equivalently, makes abatement relatively less effective.
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and the optimal path must verify the set of transversality conditions
lim
t→+∞
{exp(−ρt) Kt/Ct} = 0 and lim
t→+∞
{exp(−ρt) Bt/Ct} = 0,
which ensure that lifetime utility U is bounded.
2.3. Firms
Output of the representative firm (Yt) is produced using three inputs: a man-made
private capital (Kt), labor (Lt), and a polluting input (Zt), according to the following
Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = ÃK
α
t Z
β
t (K̄tLt)
1−α−β, (7)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1) are the elasticity of output to the private capital and
polluting input, respectively. Ã > 0 is a scale parameter, and Kt is the economy-wide
level of capital that generates positive technological spillovers onto firms productivity
(Romer, 1986).
The firm i chooses private factors (Kt, Lt and Zt) to maximize its profit
Πt = Yt − rtKt − wtLt − τpZt,
where τp is a constant environmental tax on the polluting input. The first-order conditions
give rise to
rt = α
Yt
Kt
, (8)
wt = (1 − α − β)
Yt
Lt
. (9)
τp = β
Yt
Zt
. (10)
with, at equilibrium, Lt = L. We henceforth normalize L = 1. The production function
(7) depicts a constant return-to-scale technology relative to private factors (rival inputs);
hence constant output-shares of each factor.
2.4. The government
The government provides abatement public expenditures Gt, receives taxes on labor
income (τw) and on the polluting input (τp), and borrows from households. Fiscal deficit
is financed by issuing debt (Ḃt); hence, the following budget constraint
Ḃt = rtBt + Gt − τpZt − τwwt. (11)
To study the relationship between environmental debt and public debt we need to
escape from the balanced-budget rule hypothesis, even in the long-run. To this end, we
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introduce the possibility that public deficits are permanently financed by public debt
accumulation.5 At this stage the model is not closed, because there is one free variable
in the government budget constraint (11). To close the model, the government must fix
either the public abatement spending or the public debt path. In our endogenous growth
setup, public spending is an endogenous variable, so we consider that the public debt
path follows a simple rule that links the debt-to-output ratio (bt := Bt/Yt) to a long-run
target (θ), namely6
ḃt = η(θ − bt), (12)
where η > 0 is the speed of adjustment of the debt ratio to its long-run value. This
rule serves our purpose for two reasons. First, it reflects stylized facts: many fiscal rule
implemented since the 1980s require an exogenous target of debt-to-output ratio (see
IMF, 2017).7 Second, it allows assessing the effects of the target θ on the time profile of
environmental debt.
3. Equilibrium
At symmetric equilibrium, we have K̄t = Kt, and using (7),
Yt = AKt,
where A := [Ã(τpβ)β]1/(1−β). Thanks to constant-returns at the social level, endogenous
growth can emerge, despite decreasing returns of private capital from the individual firm’s
perspective. Therefore, using (8), the real interest rate becomes
rt = αA. (13)
To obtain long-run stationary ratios, we deflate variable by output and we use lower-
case characters to depict ratios, namely: ct := Ct/Yt, gt := Gt/Yt.
The path of the capital stock is given by the goods market equilibrium
K̇t
Kt
= A(1 − gt − ct). (14)
The government’s budget constraint (11) leads to
gt = η(θ − bt) +
K̇t
Kt
bt + β + τw(1 − α − β) − αAbt. (15)
5Effectively, many papers show that endogenous growth setups are compatible with the existence of
a growing public debt in the long-run (Minea and Villieu, 2012; Boucekkine et al., 2015; Menuet et al.,
2018). The only requirement for the transversality condition to be verified is that the rate of growth of
public debt must be less than the real interest rate at equilibrium.
6Another way is to assume a deficit rule, as discussed in Menuet et al. (2018).
7Such as, e.g., θ = 60% in the Maastricht treatise.
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hence,
gt =
1
1 + Abt
[λ + η(θ − bt) + Abt(1 − ct − α)], (16)
where λ := β + τw(1 − α − β).
From (10), it follows that Zt/Yt = τp/β. Using (1), (2) and (3), the law of motion of
the environmental debt then writes
Ḋt =
(
τp
βgt
)µ
− E(Qt). (17)
From (6), (13), (14), and (17), the reduced-form of the model is
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ḃt = η(θ − bt),
ċt
ct
=
Ċt
Ct
− K̇t
Kt
= αA − ρ − A
1 + Abt
(1 − ct − λ − η(θ − bt) + αAbt) ,
Ḋt =
(
τp
βgt
)µ
− E(Q̄ − Dt).
(18)
3.1. Steady state
We define a balanced-growth path (BGP) as a path on which consumption, capital,
output, and public debt grow at the same (endogenous) rate, namely (we henceforth omit
time indexes)
γ∗ := Ċ/C = K̇/K = Ẏ /Y = Ḃ/B,
and environmental debt is constant (Ḋ = 0). The following proposition computes the
steady-state by setting ċ = ḃ = Ḋ = 0 in system (18).
Proposition 1. (Existence and Uniqueness) If ρ < min(αA,λ/θ), there is a unique BGP
with positive economic growth, environmental debt, and consumption and public spending
ratios.
Proof: Using (6) and (13), the long-run economic growth rate is γ∗ = αA − ρ, which
is positive under the mild condition A > ρ/α (that is verified for small discount rate).
From (15.b), the public debt ratio reaches its long-run target, i.e. b∗ = θ. Using (15.a),
ċ = 0 leads to 1 − c∗ = (αA −ρ)(1+θA)A − αAθ + λ, hence,
c∗ = (1 − τw)(1 + β − α) + ρ(1 + θA)/A > 0. (19)
From (16), we derive
g∗ = λ − ρθ, (20)
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which is positive as ρ is small. Finally, using (15.c), at the steady state, the environmental
debt ratio D∗ is
D∗ = Q̄ − E−1
((
τp
βg∗
)µ)
> 0. (21)
!
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, we must ensure that the unique
BGP is well determined, i.e. saddle-path stable, as state the following proposition.
Proposition 2. (Stability) The unique BGP is saddle-path stable (well-determined).
Proof : By linearization, in the neighborhood of steady state, the system (18) behaves
according to (ḃt, ċt, Ḋt) = J(bt − b∗, ct − c∗, Dt − D∗), where J is the Jacobian matrix.
As the reduced-form includes one jump variable (the consumption ratio c0) and two pre-
determined variables (the environmental debt D0 and the public-debt ratio b0 = B0/AK0,
since initial levels of public debt and capital are predetermined), for the BGP to be well
determined, J must contain two negative and one positive eigenvalues. Using (18), we
compute
J =
⎛
⎜⎝
−η 0 0
CB CC 0
DB DC E ′(·)
⎞
⎟⎠
where CC = c∗A/(1 + θA) > 0. As J is a triangular matrix, the eigenvalues are:
λ1 = −η < 0, λ2 = CC > 0 and λ3 = E ′(·) < 0. !
Proposition 2 states that the model is locally well determined. From any pre-determined
values b0 and D0, the initial consumption ratio (c0) jumps to put the economy on the
unique saddle path that converges towards the BGP. The following subsection addresses
the relationship between the public debt ratio and the environmental debt in the short-run
and the long-run.
3.2. Environmental Debt vs Public Debt
Based on the preceding dynamics analysis, the following proposition establishes the
main result of the theoretical section by assessing the effect of changes in the public-debt
target (θ) on public debt (bt) and environmental debt (Dt).
Proposition 3. Following a change in the debt target (θ), public debt and environmental
debt are (i) complement in the long-run, and (ii) substitute in the short-run, provided that
b0 < b0 := η/Aρ.
Proof : From (20), in the long-run (b∗ = θ), we observe that ∂g∗/∂θ < 0. At the ini-
tial time, the consumption ratio immediately jumps to its steady-state value (c0 = c∗).
Hence, using (16) and (19), for a given b0 > 0, we derive that ∂g0/∂θ > 0 ⇔ b0 < b0.
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Consequently, from (21), we have ∂D∗/∂θ > 0, since sgn(∂D∗/∂θ) = −sgn(∂g∗/∂θ). At
the initial time, using (18), it follows that ∂Ḋ0/∂θ = −µ(D0/g0)∂g0/∂θ < 0. As D0 is
predetermined, there is t̄ > 0, such that Dt < D0, ∀t ∈ (0, t̄). !
Proposition 4 reveals that the time profile of environmental debt basically depends
on the behavior of government abatement spending. An increase in the debt target gen-
erates new deficit that produces two opposite effects: there are (i) a permanent flow of
new resources for abatement activity (Ḃt), and (ii) a permanent flow of new unproduc-
tive expenditures (the debt burden rtBt). In the long-run, the transversality condition
(r∗ > γ∗ = Ḃ/B∗ ⇔ r∗B∗ > Ḃ) means that the latter dominates the former, hence public
debt has an adverse effect on abatement expenditure in steady-state. In the short-run, in
contrast, the first effect outweighs the second, and the new deficit provides additional re-
sources for abatement (net from the debt burden). Provided that b0 < b0, these resources
serve to increase environmental quality, reducing the ecological debt.
Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of environmental debt (the upper graph) and the
public debt ratio (the lower graph) for a baseline calibration8, following an increase in
the debt target from θ = 50% to θ = 100%. We observe that the two variables are
substitute until t̄ = 40, and complement from t̄ onward.
Figure 1: Dynamic adjustment of environmental debt and public debt following an
increase in θ
8Parameter values are:
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4. Empirical Methods
4.1. Data
Environmental Debt. We rely on cumulative carbon emissions to measure envi-
ronmental debt. We calculate cumulative historical carbon emissions, using annual data
from the Global Carbon Project. We use consumption-based emissions which have the
advantage of incorporating emissions from international transportation as well as carbon
leakages. The data are available from 1990 and are measured in million tonnes of carbon
(MtC)9. We convert annual carbon emissions in tonnes of CO2 before reporting them to
population. Thus, the environmental debt for country i at year t is given by
Dit =
t∑
j=1990
(CO2i)j
Where CO2 stands for per capita CO2 emissions. We take the natural logarithm of Dit
for the econometric analysis.
Public Debt. Data on Gross public debt come from the IMF Historical Public
finance dataset which is used in Mauro et al. (2015) and which goes back far into the
past. Public debt is measured in percent of GDP. The data on debt-to-output ratio go
up to the year 2011 for each country, therefore limiting our maximum time period length
to 22, when combined to emissions data which start from 1990. Moreover, there were
some gaps for both variables in some countries; since our sample consists in high income
and upper-middle income countries10 and because of data limitations, we end up with
a balanced panel of 22 countries over the period 1990-2011. Summary statistics of our
variables, as well as the list of countries, are reported in appendix B.
4.2. Methodology
In line with Pesaran et al. (1999), let’s assume an autoregressive distributed Lag model
(ARDL), with p lags for Environmental debt and q lags for our RHS variable, namely
public debt
LogDit =
p∑
j=1
αijLogDi,t−j +
q∑
j=0
δ
′
ijθi,t−j + µi + ϵit, (22)
with i = 1, N countries, t = 1, T periods, D environmental debt, θ the debt-to-output
ratio, µi country-specific effects, and ϵit the error term. If we assume that the variables
91MtC= 3.664 million tonnes of CO2
10Income groups defined according to the World Bank definition. We also consider CO2 emissions as
an issue of less importance in developing countries, which motivates our choice to work on countries of
the upper-middle and high income groups.
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are I(1) and cointegrated, equation 12 can be reparameterized into the following error
correction model (Pesaran et al., 1999)
∆LogDit = Φi(LogDi,t−1 − β
′
iθit) +
p−1∑
j=1
α∗ij∆LogDi,t−j +
q−1∑
j=0
δ∗
′
ij∆θi,t−j + µi + ϵit, (23)
where
Φi = −(1−
p∑
j=1
αij), βi =
q∑
j=0
δij/(1−
∑
k
αik), α
∗
ij = −
p∑
m=j+1
αim, and δ∗ij = −
q∑
m=j+1
δim.
The second part in differences of Eq. (23) illustrates the short-run adjustment to the
long-run equilibrium, while the first part- in levels- captures the long-run relationship.
The speed of adjustment is given by the error-correcting term φi, which should be negative
and significant to validate the presence of a long-run relationship.
There are three main approaches in the literature to estimate Eq. (23): (i) the
dynamic fixed effects estimator (DFE) that allows only different intercepts across units
but which turns out to be inconsistent if the common slope assumption fails to hold; (ii)
the pooled mean group estimator (PMG) which assumes common long-run coefficients
across units while allowing short-run coefficients to differ across units, and (iii) the mean
group estimator (MG) which allows slope coefficients, intercepts and errors variances to
be different across groups (Pesaran and Smith, 1995).
We start using the DFE estimator in a first stage, since we are interested in capturing
long-run dynamics, and further use the PMG estimator to also assess the short-run dy-
namic while still controlling for the long-run relationship between our variables. Following
AIC, we use an ARDL(1,1) meaning that we set p = 1 and q = 1 in Eq. 12.
4.3. Results
4.3.1. Stationarity and cointegration
To assess the stationarity of our variables, we rely on the Fisher-ADF and IPS unit
root tests. The results are reported in Table 1. In the auto-regressive specification of each
test we include both the trend and the intercept and we remove cross-sectional means
to mitigate the effects of cross-sectional correlation. As we see in table 1, irrespective
of the test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root for our
variables. Moreover, we also see that there are stationary in first-difference, meaning that
there are I(1). Since they are integrated of the same order, we therefore look for potential
cointegration relations among them.
For this purpose, we draw upon Westerlund (2007)’s tests. In these tests, the null
hypothesis of no cointegration is assumed against four different specifications of the alter-
native hypothesis: the group mean test and its asymptotic version, that both consider the
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Table 1: Unit root tests
Variables ADF IPS
Statistic p-value Statistic p-value
Log(Environmental Debt) Z: 1.65 0.95 W-T-bar: 1.38 0.92
Pm: -0.05 0.52
∆(Log Environmental Debt) Z: -7.60 0.00 W-T-bar: -6.63 0.00Pm: 13.68 0.00
Gross Public Debt Z: 2.31 0.99 W-T-bar: 2.68 0.99Pm: -1.04 0.85
∆(Gross Public Debt) Z: -2.21 0.01 W-T-bar: -5.26 0.00Pm: 2.79 0.00
Note: Pm represents the modified inverse chi-squared and Z is the inverse normal statistic. The null
hypothesis is "all panels contain unit roots". We use 1 lag following AIC. We include both trend and
intercept.
alternative assumption that there is cointegration for the panel as a whole, and the panel
mean test with its asymptotic version, which consider that the variables are cointegrated
for at least one cross-section unit in the alternative assumption. We carry out these
tests using bootstrap with 400 replications, in order to preserve size accuracy as well as
consistency in the case of cross-sectional dependence. The results of testing a potential
cointegration between environmental debt and public debt are provided by table 2. The
low p-values support the presence of cointegration between our variables in level.
Table 2: Westerlund (2007) cointegration tests
Statistic Value Z-value P-value
Gt -6.223 -18.384 0.000
Ga -47.487 -20.205 0.000
Pt -10.324 -2.450 0.007
Pa -31.742 -14.408 0.000
Note: Gt and Pt correspond respectively to the group mean test and the panel mean test. Ga and Pa
are their respective asymptotic versions. The null assumption is "no cointegration". 3 lags determined
by AIC.
Since they are I(1) and co-integrated, in the following we draw upon an error correction
model to assess the effect of public debt on environmental debt.
4.3.2. Public Debt and Environmental Debt: Full sample
Table 3 reports the results of the error correction model; the first column presents
the results of the dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimator. The error correction term is
negative and significant, thus justifying our modelling choice.
As we previously mentioned, the DFE estimator rests on an assumption of both
12
common long-run and short-run dynamics for all countries. The assumption of a common
short-run dynamic seems unrealistic, insofar as the increase of public debt in the short-
run, resulting from higher expenditure, does not necessarily lead to the same level of
abatement expenditure among countries with different environmental policies. However,
for the long-run, it is possible to assume a common path since an increase in public debt
leads to lower spending, including abatement expenditure, which in turn results in higher
environmental debt.
Table 3: Environmental Debt response
Dependent Variable Log (Environmental Debt)
DFE PMG
Error correction term -0.180∗∗∗ -0.193∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0061)
Long run coefficients
Gross public debt 0.0028∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0004)
Short run coefficients
∆(Gross public debt) -0.0009∗∗∗ -0.0017∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0007)
Constant 0.844∗∗∗ 0.840∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0341)
Observations 462 462
Countries 22 22
Log likelihood 724
Hausman Test p-value 0.5246
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
We therefore decide to allow for different short-run dynamics while still assuming a
common long-term path: to do so we rely on the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator,
which results are presented in column 2 of table 3. We test its common long-term co-
efficient assumption against the alternative hypothesis of different coefficients, using the
Hausman Chi-2 test which p-value is reported in the bottom of table 3. Since we are
not rejecting the null hypothesis of a common long-run path for countries in our sam-
ple (p-value=0.5246), we keep the specification using the PMG as our baseline for the
following.
The error correction term is also negative and significant, and the results in column
2 are consistent with our theoretical predictions: more public debt results in higher
environmental debt in the long run. To illustrate, an increase of 100 units in the debt-to-
output ratio leads to an increase of 74% in cumulative per capita CO2 in the long-run.
More public debt leads to higher environmental debt in the long run, since it implies lower
abatement expenditure in the long run. But in the short run, since higher public debt
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is linked to higher expenditure, we have a negative effect on cumulative CO2 because of
higher abatement expenditure. We see that a 100 units increase in public debt leads to
a reduction of 17% in cumulative emissions.
4.3.3. Public Debt and Environmental Debt: country evidence
Beyond full sample estimates, it could also be interesting to look at country estimates
of the short-run impact of public debt, given that it might differ across countries. Thus,
using PMG estimates from table 3, we report short-run impacts for each country in
table 4 and table 5. Regarding sign differences, most of our short-run coefficients are
negative even though many of them are non-significant. We even have a positive effect
in United States, suggesting a positive short-run relationship between public debt and
environmental debt in this country.
Table 4: Heterogeneity in short-run coefficients
Short run coefficients by country Long run
Argentina Austria Brazil China Colombia Finland France Germany Greece Italy Japan
Public Debt 0.0074***
0.0004
Error correction term -0.1979*** -0.1775*** -0.1943*** -0.1563*** -0.2126*** -0.1655*** -0.2099*** -0.1968*** -0.1997*** -0.1724*** -0.3042***
0.0206 0.0155 0.0138 0.0168 0.0126 0.0218 0.0165 0.0151 0.0155 0.0174 0.0130
∆(Public Debt) -0.0013** -0.0028 -0.0019 -0.0011 -0.0054** 0.0026 -0.0022 -0.0052 -0.0004 0.0019 -0.0016*
0.0005 0.0052 0.0016 0.0033 0.0025 0.0029 0.0039 0.0033 0.0015 0.0033 0.0008
Constant 0.7202*** 0.8764*** 0.5910*** 0.6184*** 0.6652*** 0.8909*** 0.9568*** 1.0016*** 0.8682*** 0.7688*** 1.2242***
0.0614 0.0652 0.0325 0.0504 0.0319 0.1020 0.0653 0.0657 0.0569 0.0663 0.0333
Observations 462
Countries 22
Log likelihood 724
Table 5: Heterogeneity in short-run coefficients (continued)
Short run coefficients by country Long run
Korea, Rep. Norway Portugal Romania Spain Switzerland Thailand Turkey Un. Kingdom United States Uruguay
Public Debt 0.0074***
0.0004
Error correction term -0.1804*** -0.2048*** -0.1892*** -0.1781*** -0.1738*** -0.2006*** -0.1887*** -0.1898*** -0.1913*** -0.1841*** -0.1756***
0.0132 0.0137 0.0140 0.0186 0.0168 0.0170 0.0142 0.0198 0.0153 0.0126 0.0148
∆(Public Debt) -0.0074 -0.0033 0.0026 0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0080** -0.0031** -0.0023 0.0005 0.0040* -0.0020**
0.0064 0.0021 0.0024 0.0030 0.0025 0.0033 0.0015 0.0017 0.0025 0.0021 0.0009
Constant 0.9263*** 0.9741*** 0.8182*** 0.7986*** 0.7988*** 1.0063*** 0.7004*** 0.7358*** 0.9528*** 0.9890*** 0.5943***
0.0543 0.0562 0.0485 0.0711 0.0646 0.0738 0.0412 0.0635 0.0648 0.0589 0.0383
Observations 462
Countries 22
Log likelihood 724
We also find differences in terms of magnitude across short-run impacts: for instance,
the short-run negative effect for Switzerland is four times more important than the
Uruguay’s. These findings shed light on possible short-run heterogeneities across our
sample: for some countries, the results are in line with the theoretical predictions of sub-
stitution in the short run and complementarity in the long-run between the two debts.
However, for some countries, we find no significant impact for the short-run relationship.
Even more, for a country like United States, we find a positive relation suggesting that
more public debt does not necessary lead to higher abatement expenditure in the short
run.
Thus, even if we expect countries in our sample to converge toward a common steady
state in the long run, one could assume that the short-run dynamic of their environmental
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debt can differ. Such findings invite us to explore more closely particularities at play in
our sample.
4.3.4. Public Debt and Environmental Debt: conditionality upon structural characteristics
Short-run differences we emphasized in the previous section could be linked to coun-
tries’ economic and structural differences. Thus, in the following the analyze the sen-
sitivity of our short-run coefficients to such differences. We consider four structural
characteristics; first we capture differences in terms of environmental preferences through
income (Grossman and Krueger, 1995) by considering alternatively upper-middle income
and high income countries. Second, we also consider the fiscal stance and so the leeway
in terms of public debt, using the average debt to GDP ratio over the period. We take a
60% threshold (as suggested by the Maastricht Treaty) to split countries.
Third, we take the openness degree into account through average trade in percentage
of GDP; we therefore split our countries into groups with relatively low and high openness,
based on the sample median. Finally, we also look at the average environmental debt
over the period 11 and we use its sample median to divide the sample into countries with
low and high environmental debt. Tables in appendix B present descriptive statistics and
the countries for each group.
Table 6: Environmental Debt response (conditionality upon structural characteristics)
Dependent Variable Log(Environmental Debt)
Full Sample Income group Public Debt Openness Env. Debt
Upper-Middle High Low High Low High Low High
Error correction term -0.193∗∗∗ -0.189∗∗∗ -0.195∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗ -0.203∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.180∗∗∗ -0.197∗∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0043) (0.0150) (0.0108) (0.004) (0.0057) (0.0094)
Long run coefficients
Gross public debt 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0076∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0022) (0.0004) (0.0017) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0025) (0.0014) (0.0004)
Short run coefficients
∆(Gross public debt) -0.0017∗∗ -0.0023∗∗∗ -0.0015∗ -0.0024∗∗∗ -0.0004 -0.0011∗ -0.0024∗∗ -0.0018∗∗∗ -0.0015
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0006) (0.001)
Constant 0.840∗∗∗ 0.684∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.908∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.892∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗
(0.0341) (0.0314) (0.0358) (0.0404) (0.0569) (0.0545) (0.0312) (0.0269) (0.0311)
Observations 462 126 336 294 168 252 210 168 294
Countries 22 6 16 14 8 12 10 8 14
Log likelihood 724.0 192.9 531.2 445.9 278.2 400.7 323.3 253.2 473.1
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 6 presents the results obtained for the different country groups. As we can
see, the positive long-run relationship between our variables remains robust among the
different sub-samples. Concerning the magnitudes of the long-run coefficients, we find
no significant differences between the sub-groups for income, public debt and openness.
11It its worth to mention that since we are considering averages, some of the biggest contemporary
polluters like China could appear in the group of countries with low environmental debt. This because
their emissions started increasing strongly only over recent periods; moreover, environmental debt is
calculated using consumption-based emissions rather than production-based emissions.
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These coefficients are very similar to the long-run impact we found for whole sample.
However, we find that the long-run effect for countries with an important environmental
debt is about twice the one we obtain for countries with a low environmental debt.
As in the baseline result, we also find negative and significant short-run coefficients for
most of the sub-samples, except for countries with high levels of debt, both public and
environmental.
4.3.5. Additional Robustness Checks
Table 7 provides additional robustness checks of our relation. In the first column, we
control for the level of economic activity through GDP per capita12, while in column 2
we alter our sample to remove the aftermath of the 2007-2008 crisis during which there
was an important increase in public debt.
Table 7: Additional robustness checks
Dependent Variable Log(Environmental Debt)
Estimator PMG MG
Period 1990-2011 1990-2006 1990-2011
Error Correction term -0.280∗∗∗ -0.304∗∗∗ -0.383∗∗∗
(0.0205) (0.0243) (0.0142)
Long-run coefficients
Gross public debt 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0009)
Log GDP per capita 2.236∗∗∗ 2.569∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗
(0.0530) (0.0615) 0.231
Short-run coefficients
∆(Gross public debt) -0.0021∗∗ -0.0049∗∗∗ -0.0018∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0017) (0.0008)
∆(Log GDP per capita) -0.636∗∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗ -0.580∗∗∗
(0.160) (0.139) (0.186)
Constant -5.032∗∗∗ -6.510∗∗∗ -7.670∗∗∗
(0.365) (0.505) 2.8401
Observations 462 352 462
Countries 22 22 22
Log likelihood 923.8 745.0 -
Ajd. R2 - - 0.81
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
To do so, we consider the period prior to 2007. Even though the Hausman test in
table 3 suggests us to prefer the common long-run path assumption i.e to rely on PMG
estimates, we however run a specification using Mean-group estimator in column 3. This,
12We checked again for the existence of cointegration before running estimates
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to test whether its results are qualitatively different from PMG estimates. It also includes
cross-sectional averages to account for potential cross-sectional dependence. The results
we obtain are again similar and support the presence of a complement effect in the long-
run and a substitution effect in the short-run.
5. Conclusion
Hartwick (1997) rightly argued that paying down the environmental debt is a si-
milar process than paying down public debt: both tasks mobilize billions of dollars to
be disbursed over decades to meet targets either agreed in multilateral environmental
agreements or set by fiscal rules. This paper builds on this idea while theoretically and
empirically showing that public debt and environmental debt are complements in the
long run. Our econometric results, however, evidenced some differences in short run
environmental debt dynamics. In the USA for instance, there is a positive link between
environmental and public debts in the short run. Given the fact that the USA is a
still major CO2 emitter, the sharp increase in the US public debt results in higher CO2
emissions in the short run. In the long run, however, our results support the idea that
stricter climate policies can generate environmental benefits but can also correlate to
better macroeconomic performance, as measured by debt stabilization.
Our results support the idea that, in the long run, there is no-trade-off between debt
stabilization that is a major concern, especially since the 2007-2008 crisis, and environ-
mental performance. Our findings can, however, have some theoretical and econometric
limitations. First, we have only taken public debt and public abatement expenditures.
Private debt is not accounted for despite the fact that several emerging countries already
seem to exhibit high levels of private indebtedness. Second, we assumed no composi-
tion effect of public expenditures. One could argue that the complementarity between
environmental and public debt is conditional on the relative importance of investment
and abatement expenditures. Third, we focused on global pollution as measured by cu-
mulative past CO2 emissions because of data limitations. Other global environmental
degradation measures should also be taken into account, as well as local pollution with
huge health consequences.
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Appendix A. Empirical analysis
Table B.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Cumulated CO2 (tonnes per capita) 484 91.5038 80.1105 1.5847 417.2603
Gross public debt (% GDP) 484 56.2993 35.1934 1.0267 229.61
Trade (% GDP) 484 54.067 24.3395 13.7531 140.437
Table B.2: Summary statistics of cumulated CO2 in tonnes per capita (by category)
Mean Std. Dev
Full model 91.5038 80.1105
Upper-middle Income 32.9866 24.9241
High Income 113.4477 82.6358
Low Debt 74.8888 69.5637
High Debt 120.5799 88.8118
Low Openness 76.4705 79.2713
High Openness 109.5436 77.5130
Low Env. Debt 32.45173 23.5689
High Env. Debt 125.2478 81.4784
Table B.3: Summary statistics of public debt in % of GDP (by category)
Mean Std. Dev
Full model 56.2993 35.1934
Upper-middle Income 31.4658 19.4508
High Income 65.6118 35.2743
Low Debt 40.3523 19.8290
High Debt 84.2065 38.7023
Low Openness 66.1645 41.5005
High Openness 44.4611 20.1304
Low Env. Debt 37.9689 25.1961
High Env. Debt 66.7738 35.8338
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Table B.4: Summary statistics of trade in % of GDP (by category)
Mean Std. Dev
Full model 54.067 24.3395
Upper-middle Income 52.923 30.4532
High Income 54.496 21.6426
Low Debt 58.2233 24.6436
High Debt 46.7934 22.0468
Low Openness 38.1846 12.9786
High Openness 73.1258 20.8637
Low Env. Debt 48.9801 28.0558
High Env. Debt 56.9738 21.4485
Table B.5: List of countries
Argentina Greece Switzerland
Austria Italy Thailand
Brazil Japan Turkey
China Korea, Rep. United Kingdom
Colombia Norway United States
Finland Portugal Uruguay
France Romania
Germany Spain
Table B.6: List of countries by characteristics
Income group Public Debt Openness Env. Debt
Upper-middle High Low High Low High Low High
Brazil Argentina Brazil Argentina Argentina Austria Argentina Austria
China Austria China Austria Brazil Finland Brazil Finland
Colombia Finland Colombia Germany China Germany China France
Romania France Finland Greece Colombia Korea, Rep. Colombia Germany
Thailand Germany France Italy France Norway Romania Greece
Turkey Greece Korea, Rep. Japan Greece Portugal Thailand Italy
Italy Norway Portugal Italy Romania Turkey Japan
Japan Romania United States Japan Switzerland Uruguay Korea, Rep.
Korea, Rep. Spain Spain Thailand Norway
Norway Switzerland Turkey United Kingdom Portugal
Portugal Thailand United States Spain
Spain Turkey Uruguay Switzerland
Switzerland United Kingdom United Kingdom
United Kingdom Uruguay United States
United States
Uruguay
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